APA
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Brezis, E. S., & Cariolle, J. (2017). Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks (pp. 53–76 ). Springer, Cham.
Chicago/Turabian
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Brezis, Elise S., and Joël Cariolle. “Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks.” In , 53–76 . Springer, Cham, 2017.
MLA
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Brezis, Elise S., and Joël Cariolle. Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks. Springer, Cham, 2017, pp. 53–76 .
BibTeX Click to copy
@inbook{brezis2017a,
title = {Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks},
year = {2017},
chapter = {3},
journal = {},
pages = {53–76 },
publisher = {Springer, Cham},
series = {},
author = {Brezis, Elise S. and Cariolle, Joël},
booktitle = {In: State, Institutions and Democracy: Contributions of Political Economy}
}
The “revolving door” is a practice quite widely in use in the United States, in which heads of state agencies, after completing their bureaucratic terms, are entering the very sector they have regulated. This phenomenon is also frequent in France, where it is coined “pantouflage”, and in Japan, coined “amakudari” (descent from heaven). Research conducted and data collected by the research group Corporate Europe Observatory strongly suggest that this process is also significant within EU institutions.
Keywords: commercial bank, banking sector, private firm, public procurement, political connection
